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Pylyshyn quite rightly opposes any view of visual imagery that takes the form of a naive 
"picture theory" (p. 35). He proposes instead to reduce experiences of imagery to a kind of 
"thinking"(p.3). His question: "Is the 'mind's eye' just like a real eye?" even leads him to 
derisively ask if the mind's eye has properties like a blind spot (p. 34). People who would, in 
fact, view imagery as a "picture" in the mind come dangerously close to falling into the trap of 
nai'vc realism. But by recoiling too far from this unsupportable extreme view about imagery, 
Pylyshyn seems to embrace too much the "thinking" end of the dialog between "seeing" and 
"thinking." 
To fully discuss how imagery relates to visual perception, one needs to consider all the 
facts that are known about vision and how they resemble or differ from those of imagery. 
Pylyshyn provides a nice sample of such comparisons. My comments will summarize some 
conclusions drawn from neural models of visual perception. These models gain their predictive 
force from their ability to quantitatively simulate perceptual data. The most recent models go so 
far as to quantitatively simulate the responses of identified cortical cells in known anatomical 
circuits and perceptual properties that they control; e.g., Grossberg and Raizada (2000), Raizada 
and Grossberg (2001). These models shed light on many of the facts and issues raised by 
Pylyshyn, and suggest that deciding between thinking and seeing (or imagining) is not an Either-
Or decision. Rather, there arc bottom-up and top-down interactions between seeing and thinking, 
and the top-down interactions, in the absence of bottom-up data, can give rise to an experience of 
imagery when they arc modulated by volition. Perhaps more important than these particulars, the 
models provide a theoretical rationale for why imagery exists, and constitute a rigorous 
theoretical framework in which it can be analyzed. Thus, I would contend that there is an 
emerging theory of imagery, but it is not a thing in itself. Rather, it is part of a larger neural 
theory of visual seeing and thinking. 
First let me state some of the general conclusions from this theoretical work. The first 
model, called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART (Grossberg, 1999b), suggests how brain 
mechanisms of learning, attention, and volition may give rise to mental imagery during normal 
behaviors, and to hallucinations during schizophrenia and other mental disorders. It is proposed 
that normal visual (and other) learning and memory are stabilized through the use of learned top-
down expectations. These expectations learn prototypes that are capable of focusing attention 
upon the combinations of "critical features" that comprise conscious perceptual experiences. 
When top-down expectations arc active in an attcntional priming situal!mr, they can modulate or 
sensitize their target cells to respond more effectively to matched bottom-up information. They 
cannot, however, fully activate these target cells. These predicted matching properties have been 
supported by neurophysiological experiments; e.g., Bullier eta!. (1996), Lamme eta!. (1998), 
Reynolds ct a!. ( 1999), Sill ito eta!. ( 1994). 
A recent embodiment of ART mechanisms within the laminar circuits of visual cortex, 
called the LAMINART model, suggests how the learned prototype is realized by the on-center of 
a top-down on-center off-surround network (Grossberg, 1999a). The modulatory property of such 
a top-down expectation is achieved through a balance between top-down excitation and 
inhibition within the on-center. Volitional signals can shift the balance between excitation and 
inhibition to favor net excitatory activation. Such a volitionally-mediatcd shift enables top-down 
expectations, in the absence of supportive bottom-up inputs, to cause conscious experiences of 
imagery and inner speech, and thereby to enable fantasy and planning activities to occur. If these 
volitional signals become tonically hyperactive during a mental disorder, the top-down 
expectations can give rise to conscious experiences in the absence of bottom-up inputs and 
volition. These suprathreshold events help to explain key data properties about hallucinations 
(Grossberg, 2000). The level of abstractness of learned prototypes may covary with the 
abstractness of imagery and hallucinatory content. 
Given this theoretical context, the following remarks briefly respond to some of 
Pylyshyn's concerns about imagery: (I) Both bottom-up activation of visual percepts and top-
down cognitively-activated and volitionally-modulatcd imagery are possible within the visual 
system. Seeing, imagery, and thinking are not mutually exclusive concepts. There is no 
contradiction in claiming that visually-based imagery exists and that it can be manipulated by 
cognitive constraints. (2) Visual representations arc not like images on the retina. Rather, 
depthful boundary groupings and surface representations are formed through hierarchical and 
interstream interactions in areas V2 to V4 to represent occluding and occluded surfaces, both 
modally and amodally (Lamme et a!. 1999; Schiller, 1994). FACADE theory predicts that the 
final modal figure-ground separated visual representation is formed in Y4 (Grossberg, 1994, 
I 997; Kelly and Grossberg, 2000). (3) Top-down expectations and attention operate at all levels 
of this hierarchy and can reorganize cell properties using higher-level constraints; e.g., Bullier et 
al (1996), Lamme eta!. (1998), Reynolds et al. (1999), Sillito eta!. (1994). (3) When higher-
level visual and cognitive representations and their top-down expectations act, they do not 
always have effects that are equivalent to bottom-up activation by visual scenes. For example, 
one would not expect an imagery percept of a Necker cube to be bistable if the top-down 
expectation is already biased to one interpretation. 
In summary, the "imagery debate" is often carried out as a thing in itself, without 
engaging the greater theoretical and modeling literature in vision. Recent neural models clarify 
why imagery exists and some of its mechanistic substrates as part of a larger theory of vision and 
cognition. 
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